Prediction Markets and the Matter of Information Asymmetry
Here's a potentially controversial opinion: an information advantage is actually beneficial for prediction markets.
Think about it— the essence of prediction markets is to discover true value through market forces. The richer and more fluid the information, the more accurate the market pricing—this is their fundamental purpose. Even if this information is held by a few, the market's discovery function still operates.
The key issue isn't who knows the information first, but whether prediction markets can effectively aggregate these fragmented pieces of information to make prices closer to reality. This is precisely the advantage prediction markets have over traditional voting or surveys.
Information is inherently asymmetric, but the incentive mechanisms of market participants can gradually reflect this information in prices. This isn't a bug; rather, it's the core operational logic of prediction markets as "truth machines."
View Original
This page may contain third-party content, which is provided for information purposes only (not representations/warranties) and should not be considered as an endorsement of its views by Gate, nor as financial or professional advice. See Disclaimer for details.
Prediction Markets and the Matter of Information Asymmetry
Here's a potentially controversial opinion: an information advantage is actually beneficial for prediction markets.
Think about it— the essence of prediction markets is to discover true value through market forces. The richer and more fluid the information, the more accurate the market pricing—this is their fundamental purpose. Even if this information is held by a few, the market's discovery function still operates.
The key issue isn't who knows the information first, but whether prediction markets can effectively aggregate these fragmented pieces of information to make prices closer to reality. This is precisely the advantage prediction markets have over traditional voting or surveys.
Information is inherently asymmetric, but the incentive mechanisms of market participants can gradually reflect this information in prices. This isn't a bug; rather, it's the core operational logic of prediction markets as "truth machines."