Finance Talk | Yiyaton's Excess Guarantee Hidden Dangers, Loose Provisioning of Bad Debts to Cover Up Profits

Interface News Reporter | Yuan Yingqi

As “the first A-share supply chain company,” Yi Asia Tong (002183.SZ) has been on a transformation path in recent years. Interface News reporters found that behind this company’s transformation, abnormal financial signals are becoming increasingly evident. On one side, billions of yuan in funds sit idle on the books; on the other, short-term borrowings are high, and cash flows from financing are continuously net outflows; meanwhile, the parent company has transferred over 100 billion yuan to subsidiaries, yet the bad debt provisions are far below industry peers. By the third quarter of 2025, the company’s net profit minus non-recurring gains and losses has turned from profit to loss, with a loss of 21.0651 million yuan.

What is the true operating nature of this supply chain giant? What signals are hidden behind the “dual high” of deposits and loans?

The “Dual High” Fund Puzzle

In the supply chain management industry, efficient capital turnover is vital for survival. However, recent financial reports of Yi Asia Tong depict a paradoxical picture: the company’s cash on hand has remained at hundreds of billions of yuan for years, while short-term debt continues to rise, forming a typical “dual high” dilemma.

Financial data shows that as of the end of 2024, Yi Asia Tong’s cash on hand was 13.266 billion yuan, while short-term borrowings increased to 22.624 billion yuan. Entering 2025, this abnormal structure has not improved: the third quarter report shows cash of 10.988 billion yuan, and interest-bearing liabilities (short-term loans + due within one year non-current liabilities) reached 17.919 billion yuan. More concerning is that in 2024, interest expenses exceeded 1.1 billion yuan, which sharply contradicts the “idle” funds—if the funds were truly available, the company could fully repay some high-interest debts to optimize its financial structure.

Compared with industry peers like Xiamen Xiangyu and Wuchan Zhongda, Yi Asia Tong’s interest rate spread between deposits and loans has widened abnormally. Industry insiders reveal that generally, supply chain companies need to maintain certain liquidity but manage funds centrally to minimize financial costs. Yi Asia Tong, however, shows a divergence of fund sedimentation and rising debt. Wind industry data indicates that in 2024, Xiamen Xiangyu’s cash/short-term liabilities ratio was 0.77; Wuchan Zhongda’s was 1.07. The industry average for trade companies was about 0.8. Yi Asia Tong’s ratio is only 0.59, below the industry median.

The answer lies in the notes to Yi Asia Tong’s financial statements. The 2025 semi-annual report shows that out of 10.337 billion yuan in cash, 7.2 billion yuan (70%) is restricted, mainly used for bill deposits and pledge loans. This means the actual freely available funds are only about 3.1 billion yuan, far insufficient to cover short-term debts. This “paper wealth” phenomenon signals liquidity risk.

If the “dual high” of deposits and loans is merely an abnormal static indicator, then Yi Asia Tong’s cash flow dynamics reveal a deeper crisis. Analyzing the cash flow statements of the past three years shows a cash flow pattern completely opposite to traditional companies: operating and investing activities have continuous net inflows, while financing activities show large-scale net outflows.

Reviewing Yi Asia Tong’s cash flow since 2017, the company has a total net inflow of 9.584 billion yuan from operating activities, 678 million yuan from investing activities, and a cumulative net outflow of 10.931 billion yuan from financing activities, mainly used for debt repayment. In earlier years, operating cash inflows were large, and financing net outflows were also significant. In recent years, as the scale shrank, operating cash flow decreased, and financing outflows also reduced accordingly.

Breaking down the financing details reveals the truth more clearly: in the third quarter of 2025, Yi Asia Tong received 21.733 billion yuan in cash from new borrowings, but repaid 26.657 billion yuan in debt. Key indicators show that its short-term debt rollover coverage ratio (net operating cash flow / interest-bearing debt) is even below 0.1, far from a safe threshold. Yi Asia Tong’s business model is debt-driven; even with “operating + investing” inflows, funds are still insufficient to cover debt needs, relying on “new borrowings to repay old” to barely maintain liquidity.

CPA Xu Peiling told Interface News, “For asset-heavy or high-turnover industries, continuous net outflows from financing are not necessarily abnormal, provided that operating cash flow can support investment returns and debt repayment. The problem with Yi Asia Tong is that its cash-generating capacity is far from enough to cover the massive ‘blood loss’ from debt, and this structural imbalance is the root cause of the liquidity crisis.”

Excess Collateral Risks

Yi Asia Tong’s funding difficulties are not limited to internal “bleeding”; guarantee risks are like a ticking time bomb ready to explode.

Interface News found that as of January 2026, Yi Asia Tong’s external guarantee balance reached 14.585 billion yuan, while the net assets attributable to shareholders were about 10.549 billion yuan—meaning the total guarantee amount exceeds 138% of net assets.

More alarmingly, this is not a static risk figure. As of January 2026, guarantees for Yi Asia Tong and its controlling subsidiaries amounted to 34.201 billion yuan, with a contracted guarantee amount of 22.576 billion yuan, accounting for 244.47% of the latest audited net assets; guarantees for outside companies within the scope of consolidation totaled 5.25 billion yuan, with actual guarantees of 1.43 billion yuan, and contracted guarantees of 2.2 billion yuan, accounting for 23.83% of net assets. This indicates that a large amount of guarantee capacity remains to be utilized, and total guarantees could further increase, continuously expanding risk exposure.

The core hidden danger of guarantee risk lies not only in its scale but also in the poor creditworthiness of the guaranteed entities, which are generally high-debt, high-risk. Interface News found that recent external guarantees mainly involve subsidiaries and related parties, whose asset-liability ratios generally far exceed the 70% risk warning line, with some even insolvent. For example, one guaranteed entity, Yitong New Materials Co., Ltd., has an asset-liability ratio of 96.71%; another, Shenzhen Shangfutong Network Technology Co., Ltd., has a ratio of 100.97%, already insolvent. Moreover, between July and September 2025, Yi Asia Tong issued risk alerts due to guarantee objects exceeding the 70% debt ratio.

Industry analyst Li Liping told Interface News, “Supply chain companies tend to have relatively high debt levels. If the guaranteed entities’ debt ratios exceed 70%, their repayment capacity is significantly weakened, and default risks increase sharply. In extreme cases, even partial defaults among guarantee objects could impact Yi Asia Tong’s net assets.”

More strangely, Interface News found that in the 2025 third-quarter report and recent balance sheets, Yi Asia Tong did not make any provisions for these high-risk guarantees, which is unusual. According to the “Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises No. 13—Contingencies,” when a guarantee is likely to lead to an outflow of economic benefits and the amount can be reliably measured, the enterprise should recognize a contingent liability to reflect potential liabilities.

A senior auditor told Interface News, “Failing to recognize provisions for high-risk guarantees either means the company believes the default risk is low and does not need to provision, or it underestimates potential risks by not provisioning, thereby overstating current profits. This approach violates the principle of prudence and conceals the true risk situation from the market.”

Parent Company’s Hundred Billion Intercompany Loans and Loose Bad Debt Provisions Mask Profits

If the “dual high” deposits and loans and excessive guarantees are external risks, then the nearly hundred billion yuan of intercompany funds reveal deeper internal management issues—namely, the parent company continuously injecting large sums into subsidiaries, which may have lost independent financing ability, and the company’s lenient bad debt provisions seem to underestimate risks, artificially boosting consolidated profits.

The 2025 third-quarter report shows that “other receivables” on the parent company’s balance sheet amount to 13.357 billion yuan, while in the consolidated report, this item suddenly drops to 3.534 billion yuan, a difference of 9.823 billion yuan.

Xu Peiling told Interface News, “The core reason for this discrepancy is that the parent company has provided large-scale, ongoing non-operating loans to subsidiaries, creating huge internal receivables. These loans, after offsetting, are not included in the consolidated other receivables.”

Behind this, have many of Yi Asia Tong’s subsidiaries lost their independent financing capacity, becoming “bleeding points” that rely on continuous parent company funding to survive?

Considering the high debt levels of guaranteed subsidiaries, the answer is likely yes. Those with debt ratios exceeding 90%, or even insolvent, obviously cannot generate enough funds through their own operations nor obtain external financing, and can only rely on parent loans to stay afloat. The parent company’s ongoing capital injections not only increase its own financial pressure but also severely restrict its liquidity, further amplifying the company’s overall liquidity risk.

According to Wind data, Yi Asia Tong’s transactions with related parties in 2024 totaled 10.855 billion yuan (including procurement and sales to related parties), rising to 11.605 billion yuan in 2025.

More critically, amid the large intercompany fund transfers and receivables, Yi Asia Tong’s bad debt provisions are unusually lenient, significantly lower than those of leading industry peers.

Yi Asia Tong’s accounts receivable are provisioned using two methods: “per item provisioning” and “portfolio provisioning,” with about 95% using the latter, which is the main method. “Portfolio provisioning” employs an aging migration model, adjusting provisions based on historical default rates and forward-looking factors, with specific standards: within 1 year at 1%, 1-2 years at 5%, 2-3 years at 15%.

Comparing with industry leaders, Yi Asia Tong’s bad debt provisioning standards are much more lenient. For example, Xiamen Xiangyu divides aging more finely, with higher provisioning rates: 0-3 months at 1%, 4-6 months at 2%, 7-12 months at 5%, 1-2 years at 10%, 2-3 years at 30%, over 3 years at 100%. Wuchan Zhongda’s standards are similarly strict, with provisions of 0.8% within 1 year, 30% for 1-2 years, 80% for 2-3 years, and 100% beyond 3 years.

Besides the difference in “per portfolio” provisioning ratios, the “per item” provisioning also varies significantly. For receivables that have shown signs of uncollectibility, Yi Asia Tong’s provisioning ratio is only about 50%, while Xiamen Xiangyu provisions up to 80% for such receivables.

An auditor told Interface News, “Receivables in the supply chain industry tend to be large and turnover fast. The risk of receivables over a year old is already significant, especially for related-party receivables, where risks are more easily hidden due to the relationship. Therefore, stricter bad debt provisions are necessary to prevent risks. Under the context of Yi Asia Tong’s large intercompany fund transfers and high subsidiary debt, adopting much lower provisioning standards than industry peers clearly violates the principle of prudence. Essentially, this underestimates bad debt risks, reduces provisions, and artificially inflates consolidated profits.”