Unlike centralized exchanges (CEXs)—which rely on licensed custody, order matching, and customer identity verification—DeFi executes trades, clearing, and liquidity allocation on-chain through smart contracts. Users typically hold their own private keys, and protocol governance is driven by token holders or DAO voting. This structure makes it difficult to directly apply the traditional "issuer–broker–custodian" regulatory framework, which is why U.S. enforcement has long relied on case-by-case actions (e.g., treating front-ends as brokerage activities) rather than clear rules. Project teams and developers face high uncertainty over whether BSA/AML rules apply or whether their activities constitute money transmission. If the CLARITY Act becomes law, it would fundamentally change how DeFi operators calculate compliance risk within the United States.
From an industry evolution standpoint, in May 2026 the Senate Banking Committee voted 15 to 9 to send the bill to the full Senate. The 309-page substitute text strikes a compromise among BRCA coverage, mixer provisions, and stablecoin yield restrictions under Section 404. However, bank lobbying and Democratic concerns over deposit outflows and official conflicts of interest could still reshape the final text. Below, we analyze the bill's structural impact on DeFi—covering decentralization criteria, self-custody and front-end compliance, stablecoin yields, and future sector differentiation.
Why the CLARITY Act Affects the DeFi Ecosystem
DeFi total value locked (TVL) and on-chain trading volumes remained among the top global financial innovations in 2025–2026, yet the U.S. federal level has long lacked a market structure law specifically targeting DeFi. The CLARITY Act fills this vacuum.
The bill impacts DeFi through four main pathways:
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It defines "decentralized finance trading protocol" and "decentralized finance messaging system" (commonly referred to as the "front-end") within the Commodity Exchange Act, and sets exclusion criteria so that qualifying protocol activities are not treated as illegal unregistered trading venues under CFTC jurisdiction.
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It adds a new Section 15H (House version Section 309) to the Securities Exchange Act, listing six categories of activities—including validation, oracles, UI development, and wallet software—that are exempt from exchange regulations, while preserving anti-fraud and anti-manipulation enforcement powers.
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It incorporates the BRCA, clarifying that non-controlling software developers are not money transmitters or intermediaries under the BSA.
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For "non-decentralized finance trading protocols" that still retain control, it preserves joint CFTC and SEC rulemaking authority and strengthens provisions related to mixers, offshore stablecoins, and foreign counterparties.
In July 2025, the House passed H.R. 3633 with a vote of 294–134. On May 14, 2026, the Senate Banking Committee advanced the bill to the full Senate with a 15–9 markup. DeFi provisions have now moved from conceptual discussion into a legislative sprint. Regardless of final tweaks, the direction is clear: the U.S. intends to legislatively classify DeFi, not merely rely on enforcement deterrence.
The starting point for understanding the CLARITY Act is comparing the difference in "trust anchors" between DeFi and traditional financial intermediaries.
Traditional intermediaries (banks, brokerages, exchanges) perform three core functions: centralized custody of customer assets, acting as a counterparty or central limit order matching party, and performing KYC/AML and customer suitability reviews. Regulation works because risks are concentrated in licensed entities, which can be constrained through capital adequacy, custody segregation, and examination enforcement.
Typical DeFi protocols—such as AMMs, lending pools, and perpetual futures DEXs—decompose these functions into on-chain smart contracts. Liquidity is held by pools rather than the protocol's balance sheet. Trades are executed by user signatures and contract automation. Governance parameters (fee rates, collateral factors, whitelists) are modified by governance token voting or timelock multisigs. Users interact directly with contracts via wallets, and protocol teams often claim they "only provide open-source code."
This difference creates regulatory headaches: when a hack occurs, governance is hijacked, or a front-end is injected with malicious contracts, who is liable—the developers, the DAO, the validators, or the users? The CLARITY Act's answer is not to exempt DeFi wholesale, but to draw a line based on control over user funds and trade execution. With control, regulate as an intermediary; without control, grant statutory safe harbors.
How the CLARITY Act Defines "True Decentralization"
The Act's definition of "decentralization" is not a slogan but a set of testable statutory conditions, centered on the "decentralized finance trading protocol."
A qualifying protocol must satisfy: multiple participants can execute financial transactions under predetermined, non-discretionary automated rules; and at no point in the entire transaction process does anyone else maintain control over users' digital assets.
The following situations are explicitly excluded from the definition of a "decentralized finance trading protocol" (i.e., considered "non-decentralized" and subject to further rules):
(1) Any person or group of persons acting in concert has the authority, directly or indirectly, to control or materially alter the chain's functions, operations, or consensus rules;
(2) The chain's operations, execution, and enforcement are not entirely based on predetermined and transparent rules encoded in the source code.
Important exception: A "decentralized governance system" is not itself considered a "person or group under common control." This leaves room for DAO voting to modify parameters, but if governance is effectively controlled by a small number of whales or the founding team, it may still be recharacterized during enforcement or certification review.
The Senate's May 2026 text also separately protects validators, sequencers, oracle providers, node operators, and incident response committees. It allows decentralized governance systems to benefit from additional safe harbors when acting in a ministerial capacity. The overall standard can be summarized as: code rules are public, cannot be unilaterally rewritten, and user assets are never custodied—starkly contrasting with protocols where "the team can upgrade contracts at any time, freeze addresses, or censor transactions."
What Changes for Developers, DAOs, and Protocol Governance
For developers, the BRCA is the most directly relevant provision in the CLARITY Act: software developers who do not control, custodian, or hold others' funds and private keys should not be classified as money transmitters or bear BSA intermediary obligations. This aligns with FinCEN's 2019 guidance on convertible virtual currencies. The 2026 Senate version adds an exception: criminal provisions still apply to those who knowingly transfer funds derived from or intended for criminal activity—addressing law enforcement concerns about money laundering abuse and reminding developers not to turn a blind eye to illegal use.
For DAOs and protocol governance, the Act recognizes the special status of decentralized governance systems, but this does not mean DAOs are entirely beyond regulatory reach. If a DAO treasury is controlled by a small multisig, governance participation is extremely low, and upgrade keys are concentrated in the founding team, it may still be found to have substantial control over the protocol, triggering "non-decentralized" rules or anti-fraud enforcement. Project teams must redesign governance timelines, lock-up releases, and on-chain transparency to support future migration toward a mature blockchain system or decentralization certification path.
Section 15H lists exempt activities: compiling/relaying/sequencing/validating transactions; providing hash power, nodes, and oracle services; developing read-only data interfaces; publishing blockchain or DeFi protocols; operating liquidity pools associated with DeFi protocols (under qualifying definitions); and developing wallets that help users self-custody their private keys. Important caveat: anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions still apply—"technology neutrality" does not equal "behavioral impunity."
Why Self-Custody Becomes a Regulatory Focus
Self-custody is the cornerstone of the DeFi narrative and an area of relatively high political consensus in the CLARITY Act. Section 15H(a)(6) explicitly states: developing or publishing a wallet or system that helps individual users self-custody their digital assets and private keys does not constitute intermediary activity under the Securities Exchange Act. The Senate text also incorporates the spirit of the Keep Your Coins Act, emphasizing that citizens' right to hold private keys and independently initiate on-chain transactions should not be effectively prohibited by federal agencies.
Regulatory attention on self-custody stems from a two-way tension. On one hand, self-custody weakens traditional intermediary AML leverage; provisions on mixers and cross-border transfers (e.g., Section 309 amendments to mixers/tumblers) reflect law enforcement's persistent concerns about anonymity. On the other hand, after the collapse of custodial platforms like FTX, both Congress and the industry recognize the value of "Not your keys, not your coins" for consumer protection—overly restricting self-custody could push innovation offshore.
Therefore, the CLARITY Act combines protection of self-custody tools with combating abuse. Wallets and non-custodial front-ends that merely assist user signing and do not touch funds are inclined toward exemption. If a front-end can execute on behalf of users, freeze assets, or redirect user assets, it may be deemed an unqualified messaging system or constitute brokerage activity. On the user side, self-custody means bearing losses personally—the Act does not provide "on-chain deposit insurance."
DeFi Front-Ends, KYC, and Compliance Trends
DeFi "front-ends" (websites, apps, aggregators) correspond to the Act's "decentralized finance messaging system": software that submits instructions to a decentralized finance trading protocol for users to execute trades themselves. The key limitation is that it must not enable anyone other than the user to have control over user funds or trade execution. This means that custodial front-ends, "convenience portals" that can suspend withdrawals, or relayers that sign on behalf of users may lose exemption if they have excessive authority.
Regarding KYC, purely on-chain, non-custodial protocols themselves are not required to directly collect identity information. However, centralized on-ramps dealing with U.S. persons, fiat on-ramp channels, custodial wallets, and entities classified as digital commodity brokers/dealers must perform AML obligations under the BSA framework. Title II of the Act strengthens review standards for digital asset service providers. CeFi and "semi-centralized" DeFi (where a team operates the front-end and controls upgrade keys) will face compliance costs closer to those of banks and brokerages.
A trend toward "dual-track front-ends" may emerge: a compliant front-end for U.S. IPs (geo-fencing + KYC + only connects to whitelisted contracts) coexisting with a permissionless front-end for global users. The protocol layer may remain open source, but traffic and liquidity will be channeled through compliant entry points. Aggregators and portfolio management tools that provide investment advice to U.S. persons may still trigger SEC investment adviser rules—the CLARITY Act does not fully exempt such activities.
How the CLARITY Act May Affect Stablecoin Yield Models
Stablecoins are the liquidity foundation of DeFi, and the CLARITY Act intersects with DeFi through Title IV, Section 404. The 2026 Senate Banking version renamed the provision to "Prohibition on Payment of Interest or Returns on Payment Stablecoins," prohibiting covered parties (digital asset service providers and their affiliates) from paying holders passive returns that are economically or functionally equivalent to bank deposit interest. However, rewards tied to real usage—such as payments, transfers, or on-chain activities—may be preserved after joint SEC, CFTC, and Treasury rulemaking within 12 months.
For DeFi, the direct impacts include: static deposit rebates on USDC/USDT in lending protocols, "hold stablecoins to earn yield" products on centralized platforms, and in-wallet stablecoin savings features will need restructuring. Liquidity mining, if recharacterized as a disguised form of interest, may also be tightened. Between the Tillis–Alsobrooks compromise in March 2026 and the May markup, banking groups continued to push for stricter language, and the stock prices of issuers like Circle reacted to policy expectations. With global stablecoin circulation of approximately $316–$320 billion, changes in yield rules will reshape the incentive structures of DEXs and lending markets.
An indirect impact is that DeFi may shift more toward non-stablecoin collateral, on-chain native yields (trading fees, staking rewards), and "proof-of-activity" incentives to circumvent Section 404's red line. At the same time, permitted payment stablecoins under the GENIUS Act will diverge from non-permissioned stablecoins in compliant DeFi pools.
What Structural Changes May Emerge in the DeFi Ecosystem
If the CLARITY Act is signed into law or approaches enactment in 2026, DeFi could undergo several structural changes:
Accelerated compliance and geographic bifurcation. U.S.-based teams may retain core protocols as non-custodial open-source entities, while registering commercial entities as CFTC digital commodity brokers or serving only non-U.S. users. Liquidity and developers will split into a "U.S. compliance layer" and a "global permissionless layer."
Protocol design evolves toward provable decentralization. Timelocks, governance delays, immutable contracts, and on-chain auditable upgrade logs will become standard to meet statutory exclusion conditions and reduce the risk of being deemed a non‑decentralized protocol.
Middleware repriced. "Web3 infrastructure" players—oracles, RPCs, sequencers, MEV relays—benefit from explicit statutory protections. Mixers and non-KYC fiat gateways face heightened enforcement and legislative pressure.
Institutional DeFi and RWA convergence. Title V's adjustments to securities tokenization provide room for on-chain Treasuries, private credit, and other RWAs to enter compliant DeFi pools, potentially channeling institutional capital through permissioned pools rather than fully permissionless "wild pools."
Innovation sandbox alongside enforcement. The SEC–CFTC innovation sandbox and joint DeFi study (Section 504 research provision) may offer experimental channels for new models, but anti-fraud and sanctions compliance will not loosen—"clarity" does not mean "leniency."
Conclusion
The significance of the CLARITY Act for DeFi lies in establishing "whether there is control over user assets and rules" as the main axis of federal regulation. Truly non-custodial protocols, developers, validators, and self-custody wallets may gain statutory safe harbors. Entities that still retain unilateral control, can censor transactions, or provide fiat channels to U.S. persons—"DeFi shell, CeFi core"—will be subject to registration and AML obligations comparable to traditional intermediaries.
Will decentralized finance usher in a "clearer regulatory era"? The answer leans toward a conditional yes. If clear rules are ultimately enacted, the probability of developers leaving the U.S. due to regulatory uncertainty will decrease, and institutions will be encouraged to participate in on-chain liquidity within a licensed framework. However, stablecoin yield restrictions, mixer provisions, and preserved anti-fraud enforcement powers mean that U.S. DeFi will operate in a corridor that is more transparent, yet narrower.
Source (for reference only):
与中心化交易所（CEX）依赖牌照托管、订单撮合与客户身份识别不同，DeFi 通过智能合约在链上完成交易、清算与流动性分配，用户通常自持私钥，协议治理由代币持有者或 DAO 投票驱动。这种结构使传统「发行人—经纪商—托管行」监管模板难以直接套用，也导致美国执法长期依赖个案（如将前端界面视为经纪活动）而非清晰规则，项目方与开发者面临 BSA/AML 是否适用、是否构成货币传输等高度不确定风险。CLARITY Act 若落地，将显著改变 DeFi 在美国境内的合规可计算性。
从产业演进视角看，2026 年 5 月参议院 Banking 委员会以 15 票赞成、9 票反对将法案送交全院，309 页替代文本在 BRCA 保护范围、混币器条款与稳定币 Section 404 收益限制之间取得妥协，但银行游说与民主党议员对存款外流、官员利益冲突等议题仍可能改变最终文本。下文围绕法案对 DeFi 生态的结构性影响、去中心化认定标准、自托管与前端合规、稳定币收益及未来赛道分化展开分析。
CLARITY Act 为什么会影响 DeFi 生态
DeFi 总锁仓价值（TVL）与链上交易量在 2025–2026 年仍居全球金融创新前列，但美国联邦层面长期缺乏专门针对 DeFi 的市场结构法。CLARITY Act 改变了这一空白。
法案对 DeFi 的影响路径主要有四条。
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在《商品交易法》中定义 decentralized finance trading protocol（去中心化金融交易协议）与 decentralized finance messaging system（去中心化金融消息系统，即常见「前端」），并设定排除条件，使符合标准的协议活动不被视为 CFTC 管辖下的非法未注册交易场所。
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在《证券交易法》新增第 15H 条（House 版本 Section 309），列举验证、预言机、UI 开发、钱包软件等六类活动可豁免于交易所法，但反欺诈与反操纵执法权保留。
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纳入 BRCA，明确非控制性软件开发者不承担货币传输商或 BSA 意义上的中介义务。
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对仍具控制权的「非去中心化金融交易协议」保留 CFTC 与 SEC 联合规则制定权，并强化混币器（mixer）、离岸稳定币与外国对手方相关条款。
2025 年 7 月众议院以 294–134 通过 H.R. 3633；2026 年 5 月 14 日参议院 Banking 委员会 markup 后以 15–9 推进全院议程，DeFi 条款进入立法冲刺而非概念讨论阶段。无论最终文本如何微调，方向已明确：美国要对 DeFi「立法分类」，而非仅依赖执法威慑。
DeFi 协议与传统金融中介有何不同
理解 CLARITY Act 的切入点，是比较 DeFi 与传统金融中介在「信任锚点」上的差异。
传统中介（银行、券商、交易所）承担三项核心职能：集中托管客户资产、作为交易对手方或中央限价撮合方、履行 KYC/AML 与客户适当性审查。监管之所以可行，是因为风险集中在持牌机构，可通过资本充足率、托管隔离与检查执法加以约束。
典型 DeFi 协议（如 AMM、借贷池、永续合约 DEX）则将这些职能拆解为链上智能合约：流动性由池子持有而非平台资产负债表；交易由用户签名、合约自动执行；治理参数（费率、抵押因子、白名单）由治理代币投票或 timelock 多签修改。用户通过钱包直接与合约交互，协议团队往往声称「仅提供开源代码」。
这种差异带来监管难题：当黑客攻击、治理被劫持或前端被植入恶意合约时，责任主体是开发者、DAO、验证者还是用户？CLARITY Act 的回应不是将 DeFi 整体豁免，而是按「是否控制用户资金与交易执行」画线——有控制则按中介监管，无控制则适用法定安全港。
CLARITY Act 如何界定「真正的去中心化」
法案对「去中心化」的界定并非口号，而是一组可检验的法定条件，主要围绕 decentralized finance trading protocol 展开。
符合定义的协议须满足：多参与者可在 predetermined、non-discretionary 的自动化规则下完成金融交易；且在交易全程任何环节均不依赖他人维持对用户数字资产的控制。
下列情形被明确排除在「去中心化交易协议」之外（即视为「非去中心化」、需适用进一步规则）：
（1）任何个人或共同控制群体有权直接或间接控制或实质性改变链的功能、运行或共识规则；
（2）链的运行、执行与 enforcement 并非完全基于源代码中预先设定且透明的规则。
重要例外：decentralized governance system（去中心化治理系统）本身不被视为「共同控制下的个人或群体」。这为 DAO 投票修改参数留出空间，但若治理实质被少数巨鲸或创始团队操控，仍可能在执法或认证审查中被穿透认定。
参议院 2026 年 5 月文本还单独保护验证者、排序者（sequencer）、预言机提供者、节点运营者与事件响应委员会；允许去中心化治理系统在以 ministerial（行政性）身份行事时享有额外安全港。整体标准可概括为：代码规则公开、不可单方随意改写、用户资产全程非托管——与「团队可随时升级合约、冻结地址、审查交易」的协议形成鲜明对比。
开发者、DAO 与协议治理面临哪些变化
对开发者而言，BRCA 是 CLARITY Act 中最具直接意义的条款：不控制、不托管他人资金与私钥的软件开发者，不应被归类为货币传输商或承担 BSA 中介义务；这与 FinCEN 2019 年可转换虚拟货币指引精神一致。2026 年参议院版本在 BRCA 中新增例外：对明知犯罪所得或去向仍故意转移资金者，仍适用相关刑事条款——意在回应执法部门对洗钱滥用的关切，亦提醒开发者不可对非法用途视而不见。
DAO 与协议治理方面，法案承认去中心化治理系统的特殊地位，但并不意味着 DAO 完全游离于监管之外。若 DAO 金库由少数多签控制、治理投票率极低、升级密钥集中于创始团队，仍可能被认定为对协议具有实质控制权，从而适用「非去中心化」规则或反欺诈执法。项目方需重新设计治理时间表、锁仓释放与链上透明度，以支撑未来向 mature blockchain system 或去中心化认证路径迁移。
Section 15H 列举的豁免活动涵盖：编译/中继/排序/验证交易；提供算力、节点与预言机服务；开发只读数据界面；发布区块链或 DeFi 协议；运营与 DeFi 协议相关的流动性池（在符合定义前提下）；开发钱包等帮助用户自行保管私钥的软件。例外在于：反欺诈与反操纵条款仍适用——「技术中立」不等于「行为免责」。
自托管（Self-Custody）为何成为监管重点
自托管是 DeFi 叙事的基石，也是 CLARITY Act 中政治共识相对较高的领域。法案在 Section 15H(a)(6) 明确：开发、发布帮助个人用户自行保管数字资产及私钥的钱包或系统，不构成适用《证券交易法》的中介活动。参议院文本另纳入 Keep Your Coins Act 相关精神，强调公民持有私钥、自主发起链上交易的权利不应被联邦机构变相禁止。
监管关注自托管的原因在于双向张力。一方面，自托管削弱传统中介 AML 抓手，混币器与跨境转移条款（如 Section 309 对 mixer/tumbler 的修订）反映执法机构对匿名性的持续担忧。另一方面，FTX 等托管平台暴雷后，国会与业界均认同「Not your keys, not your coins」对消费者保护的价值，过度限制自托管可能将创新推向离岸。
因此，CLARITY Act 采取「保护自托管工具、打击滥用工具」的组合：钱包与非托管前端若仅协助用户签名、不触碰资金，倾向豁免；若前端可代为执行、冻结或分流用户资产，则可能被认定为 messaging system 不合格或构成经纪活动。用户侧需理解：自托管意味着损失自担，法案不提供「链上存款保险」。
DeFi 前端、KYC 与合规化趋势解析
DeFi「前端」（网站、App、聚合器）在法案中对应 decentralized finance messaging system：向去中心化交易协议提交指令、供用户自行成交的软件。关键限制是：不得使除用户以外的任何人对用户资金或交易执行拥有控制权。这意味着托管式前端、可暂停提现的「便捷入口」、代用户签名的 relayer 若权限过大，可能丧失豁免。
KYC 方面，纯链上、非托管协议本身不被要求直接收集身份；但与美国人打交道的中心化入口、法币出入金通道、托管钱包及被认定为 digital commodity broker/dealer 的主体，须在 BSA 框架下履行 AML 义务。法案 Title II 强化数字资产服务提供商的审查标准，CeFi 与「半中心化」DeFi（团队运营前端、控制升级密钥）将面临与银行、券商更接近的合规成本。
趋势上可能出现「双轨前端」：面向美国 IP 的合规前端（geo-fencing + KYC + 仅连接白名单合约）与面向全球的无需许可前端并存；协议层或保持开源，但流量与流动性通过合规入口集中。聚合器与投资组合管理工具若对美国人提供投资建议，仍可能触发 SEC 投资顾问规则——CLARITY Act 未全面豁免此类活动。
CLARITY Act 会如何影响稳定币收益模式
稳定币是 DeFi 的流动性基石，CLARITY Act 通过 Title IV Section 404 与 DeFi 产生交叉影响。2026 年参议院 Banking 版本将条款更名为「禁止对支付稳定币支付利息与收益」，禁止 covered parties（数字资产服务提供商及其关联方）向持有人支付与银行存款在经济或功能上等价的被动收益；但与支付、转账、链上活动等真实使用挂钩的奖励，可在 SEC、CFTC 与财政部 12 个月内联合规则后保留。
对 DeFi 而言，直接影响包括：借贷协议中 USDC/USDT 的静态存款返利、中心化平台「持稳生息」产品、钱包内置的稳定币储蓄功能需重构；流动性挖矿若被认定为变相利息，亦可能收紧。2026 年 3 月 Tillis–Alsobrooks 妥协与 5 月 markup 前后，银行团体仍推动更严格措辞，Circle 等发行方股价曾对政策预期作出反应；全球稳定币流通量约 3160–3200 亿美元，收益规则变动将重塑 DEX 与借贷市场的激励结构。
间接影响是：DeFi 可能更多转向非稳定币抵押、链上原生收益（交易费、质押奖励）及「活动证明」式激励，以避开 Section 404 红线；同时，符合 GENIUS Act 的 permitted payment stablecoin 将与非许可稳定币在合规 DeFi 池中分化。
DeFi 生态未来可能出现哪些变化
若 CLARITY Act 在 2026 年签署或接近落地，DeFi 生态可能出现以下结构性变化。
合规与地缘分化加速。美国团队或将核心协议保留为非托管开源形态，商业实体注册为 CFTC 数字商品经纪商或仅服务非美国用户；流动性与开发者呈现「美国合规层 + 全球无需许可层」双轨。
协议设计向「可证明去中心化」演进。时间锁、治理延迟、immutable 合约、链上可审计升级日志将成为标配，以匹配法定排除条件并降低被认定为 non-decentralized protocol 的风险。
中间层重新定价。预言机、RPC、排序器、MEV 中继等「Web3 基建」因获法定角色保护而受益；混币器、无 KYC 法币通道则面临更强执法与立法压力。
机构 DeFi 与 RWA 融合。法案 Title V 对证券代币化的调整为链上国债、私募信贷等 RWA 进入合规 DeFi 池提供空间，机构资金或通过许可池而非完全无需许可的「野池」进入。
创新沙盒与执法并行。SEC–CFTC 创新沙盒、DeFi 联合研究（Section 504 研究条款）可能为新模式提供试验通道，但反欺诈、制裁合规不会放松——「清晰」不等于「宽松」。
总结
CLARITY Act 对 DeFi 的意义，在于将「是否控制用户资产与规则」确立为联邦监管的主轴：真正的非托管协议、开发者、验证者与自托管钱包有望获得成文法安全港；仍具单方控制权、可审查交易或向美国人提供法币通道的「DeFi 外壳、CeFi 内核」主体，则将纳入与传统中介相当的注册与 AML 义务。
去中心化金融是否会迎来「更清晰的监管时代」？答案倾向于有条件肯定：规则边界若最终落地，将降低开发者因监管不确定而离美的概率，并促进机构在许可框架内参与链上流动性；但稳定币收益限制、混币器条款与执法保留的反欺诈权力，也意味着美国 DeFi 将在更透明但更窄的走廊中运行。
